Reynolds v. United States: The Supreme Court Case That Defined Religious Freedom Limits
How an 1879 polygamy case established that the First Amendment protects belief, not all religious conduct.
- Reynolds v. United States (1879) ruled that religious belief is absolutely protected, but religious conduct can be limited by law.
- The case arose when George Reynolds, a Mormon, was prosecuted for polygamy despite claiming it was a religious duty.
- Chief Justice Waite's decision created the 'belief-action distinction'—a framework that shaped religious freedom law for over a century.
- The ruling allowed the federal government to enforce laws of general applicability against religious practices, even sincere ones.
Reynolds v. United States is an 1879 Supreme Court decision that fundamentally shaped how American law treats religious freedom. The case established a legal principle that has echoed through courts ever since: the First Amendment absolutely protects what you believe, but it does not necessarily protect what you do in the name of that belief. A person's sincere religious conviction, the Court ruled, does not exempt them from following laws that apply equally to everyone.
The Case: A Mormon's Polygamy Conviction
George Reynolds was a secretary to Brigham Young, the leader of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In the 1870s, Reynolds had multiple wives—a practice the Church taught was a religious duty and a path to spiritual salvation. Federal law, however, explicitly banned polygamy in U.S. territories. Reynolds was arrested, tried, and convicted under the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862.
Reynolds appealed his conviction all the way to the Supreme Court. His defense was straightforward: polygamy was a core religious practice for him and his faith. He argued that punishing him for it violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The federal government countered that no religious belief could excuse someone from obeying a neutral law that applied to all citizens equally.
The Ruling: The Belief-Action Distinction
Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected Reynolds's appeal. Waite acknowledged that the First Amendment protects religious *belief* without limit. No government can force someone to abandon their faith or punish them for what they think. But conduct—what people *do*—is different. Laws of general applicability (laws that apply to everyone, not just religious people) can restrict religious conduct if the government has a legitimate reason for the law.
Waite drew a historical line, citing Thomas Jefferson's 1786 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and James Madison's writings. He argued that allowing religious belief to excuse people from generally applicable laws would create chaos—anyone could claim a religious exemption from any law. The polygamy ban, he reasoned, was a neutral law designed to protect the institution of marriage and family stability. It applied to everyone, not just Mormons. Therefore, Reynolds had no constitutional right to an exemption.
Why This Case Matters and When It Applied
Reynolds v. United States became the controlling framework for religious freedom cases for nearly a century. It meant that religious minorities could not use their faith as a shield against laws everyone else had to follow. This had immediate consequences: the anti-polygamy laws were enforced aggressively against the Mormon Church, forcing it to officially abandon the practice in 1890 as a condition of Utah statehood.
More broadly, the belief-action distinction shaped how courts handled cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses (who refused military service and blood transfusions), Native Americans (whose religious ceremonies used peyote), and many others. If a law was neutral and generally applicable, courts rarely granted religious exemptions. This logic persisted until 1963, when the Court began softening this standard, and especially after 1990 when a new, more restrictive test replaced it.
- Belief: Absolutely protected by the First Amendment; government cannot punish or restrict what you think or believe.
- Action/Conduct: Can be regulated by neutral laws of general applicability; religious motivation does not automatically exempt you from following them.
- The key question: Is the law neutral (applies to everyone) or does it target religion specifically?
How the Standard Evolved
Reynolds's strict approach didn't last unchanged. In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court began requiring the government to show a 'compelling interest' before denying religious exemptions—a much higher bar. This meant some religious practices could get protection even if laws were neutral. Then in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court swung back toward Reynolds, reinstating the idea that neutral laws don't require exemptions. Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993), which tried to restore the higher 'compelling interest' standard. The legal landscape remains contested today, with courts still wrestling with where to draw the line Reynolds first sketched.
Sources
- Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Chief Justice Morrison Waite's majority opinion.
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
- Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
