Reynolds v. United States: How the Supreme Court Defined Religious Freedom Limits

An 1879 Supreme Court ruling that separated religious belief from religious practice—establishing that the First Amendment protects your faith but not all actions done in its name.

By Garret Merkley · Explainer · Aug 19, 2026

Branched from The Legal and Social Challenges of Plural Marriage in the 19th Century

Quick take

Reynolds v. United States (1879) upheld a federal law banning polygamy, even though the defendant claimed it was central to his Mormon faith.
The Court distinguished between protected belief (what you think) and unprotected conduct (what you do), a framework that shaped religious liberty law for 140+ years.
The ruling gave government broad power to regulate religious practices if they violated neutral laws of general applicability—a standard that stood until 1990.
Modern religious freedom law has partly moved away from Reynolds, but the belief-vs.-conduct split remains foundational to how courts balance faith and law.

Reynolds v. United States is a foundational 1879 Supreme Court case that upheld a federal law criminalizing polygamy, rejecting the argument that the practice was protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. George Reynolds, a Mormon who practiced plural marriage as part of his faith, was convicted under an 1862 federal statute. The Court ruled unanimously that while the government cannot punish someone for their religious beliefs, it can prohibit religious conduct—in this case, polygamy—when that conduct violates a neutral law that applies to everyone. This case established a two-part test that governed religious freedom claims for over a century.

The Belief-vs.-Conduct Framework

Chief Justice Morrison Waite's majority opinion drew a sharp line between what people are allowed to believe and what they are allowed to do. Religious belief, the Court held, is absolutely protected—the government cannot punish you simply for holding a faith or an opinion about God. But religious conduct—actions taken because of that belief—receives less protection. The Court reasoned that if conduct were fully protected whenever someone claimed a religious motivation, the government could not enforce any law. A person could claim religious exemption from murder, theft, or any statute by asserting that their faith required it. To prevent this, the Court held that the government can restrict religious practices if those restrictions serve a legitimate public interest and apply equally to everyone, regardless of their faith.

The Reynolds decision applied this framework to polygamy specifically. The Court acknowledged that plural marriage was important to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the LDS Church) and that Reynolds sincerely believed it was his religious duty. But the Court found that Congress had a legitimate interest in protecting the institution of monogamous marriage and the stability of the family unit. Because the federal statute prohibited polygamy for everyone—not just Mormons—it was a neutral law of general applicability. Therefore, it could be enforced against Reynolds even though his conduct was religiously motivated.

Why Reynolds Mattered for Religious Liberty Law

Reynolds v. United States became the controlling standard for religious freedom cases for the next 111 years. Under this framework, courts asked two questions: (1) Is the law neutral and generally applicable—that is, does it apply to everyone regardless of religion? (2) Does the government have a legitimate interest in enforcing it? If the answer to both was yes, the law could be applied to religious practitioners even if it burdened their faith. This meant that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment offered little protection to religious minorities whose practices conflicted with general laws.

The practical effect was significant. Native Americans could be prosecuted for using peyote in religious ceremonies because drug laws applied generally. Jehovah's Witnesses could be compelled to salute the flag in school despite their religious objections. Amish communities could be required to send their children to public school or comply with Social Security taxes. The Reynolds standard gave government substantial leeway to regulate religious conduct, even when that regulation imposed real burdens on sincere faith practices. Only in rare cases did courts find that a law was not neutral or that the government's interest was not legitimate.

The Shift Away from Reynolds

In 1990, the Supreme Court formally reaffirmed the Reynolds framework in Employment Division v. Smith, ruling that neutral laws of general applicability need not meet strict scrutiny even when they burden religious practice. But this decision sparked a backlash. Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, which required the government to show a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means when a law substantially burdens religious exercise—a much stricter standard than Reynolds allowed. Many states passed their own versions of RFRA. This legislative response reflected a judgment that Reynolds had tipped the balance too far toward government power and away from religious freedom.

More recently, courts have begun to question whether Reynolds's belief-conduct distinction makes sense in modern contexts. In cases like Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), the Supreme Court found that laws that appeared neutral were actually targeted at religious practice or enforced in a way that discriminated against religion. These decisions suggest a movement away from Reynolds's permissive approach, though the case remains cited and its core logic—that some religious conduct can be regulated—has not been abandoned.

Why This Case Still Matters

Reynolds remains relevant because the tension it identified—between protecting religious freedom and enforcing general laws—has not gone away. Courts still grapple with questions like whether religious employers can be exempt from anti-discrimination laws, whether religious objectors can refuse to provide services for same-sex marriages, and whether religious communities can opt out of regulations that conflict with their faith. The belief-vs.-conduct distinction still shapes how courts think about these questions, even if they no longer apply Reynolds's deferential standard. Understanding Reynolds is essential to understanding why religious freedom claims sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in modern American law.

The Reynolds Standard in Practice

Neutral law of general applicability: Does the law apply to everyone, or is it aimed at religion? (Reynolds said it must apply generally.)
Legitimate government interest: Does the government have a valid reason for the law? (Reynolds gave this broad deference.)
Burden on religion: Is the religious practice actually restricted? (Reynolds did not require the government to minimize this burden.)
Modern approach: Courts now ask if the law is truly neutral and whether the government's interest is compelling—a much harder test for the government.

Did Reynolds end religious freedom in America?

No, but it significantly limited it. The case established that religious beliefs are protected absolutely, but religious conduct can be restricted if a neutral law serves a legitimate government interest. This framework gave government broad power to regulate religious practices, which is why many people today view Reynolds as having swung the balance too far. Modern laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act have partly corrected this.

Why did the Supreme Court focus on polygamy rather than religious belief itself?

The Court was concerned that if religious belief alone could justify any conduct, the law would be unenforceable. A person could claim religious exemption from murder, theft, or any statute. By distinguishing belief from conduct, the Court preserved government's ability to enforce general laws while still protecting religious thought and opinion. This logic remains influential even in modern cases.

Has Reynolds been overruled?

Not formally, but it has been significantly weakened. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993) and subsequent court decisions have moved away from Reynolds's permissive standard. Courts now scrutinize whether laws are truly neutral and whether the government's interests are truly compelling. But Reynolds's core principle—that some religious conduct can be regulated—has not been rejected.

How does Reynolds apply to modern religious freedom cases?

Reynolds is still cited, but courts now interpret its framework more strictly. In cases involving LGBTQ rights, healthcare mandates, or religious exemptions from civil rights laws, courts ask whether a law is genuinely neutral or whether it discriminates against religion. If it discriminates, it faces strict scrutiny. Reynolds suggested that general laws needed only rational basis review; modern law requires much more from the government.

What would Reynolds say about religious exemptions from vaccine mandates or mask requirements?

Under pure Reynolds logic, the government could enforce these laws because they apply generally and serve a legitimate health interest. But modern courts would ask whether the law is truly neutral—for example, whether it allows secular exemptions that are not granted to religious objectors. If religious objectors are treated worse than similarly situated secular objectors, the law might fail even under a Reynolds-like framework.

Sources

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1993).
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).