Independent report finds LA sent firefighters home before Palisades fire, left residents unwarned for up to 90 minutes

A helicopter pilot radioed at 10:46 a.m. on January 7, 2025, that flames would reach homes in Pacific Palisades 'within minutes.' A warning to evacuate was not issued by the Los Angeles Fire Department until 12:09 p.m. — and some residents closest to where the fire started never received an alert until 40 to 90 minutes after their homes had already begun to burn.

That gap sits at the center of a 724-page independent fire incident analysis released Friday by the UL Research Institutes' Fire Safety Research Institute, commissioned by Gov. Gavin Newsom nearly 21 months after the Palisades and Eaton fires killed 31 people and destroyed more than 16,250 structures across the Los Angeles area. The report contains 175 findings and more than 250 recommendations. Rather than faulting any single person or agency, the report concludes that the destruction 'was the result of multiple interconnected factors rather than any single decision, event, or system failure' — with the Los Angeles Fire Department bearing the brunt of the criticism.

The alert failures were not simply a matter of speed. The city was mid-transition to new alert software when the fire broke out. Workers drawing evacuation zones relied on street names read aloud over the radio and at times needed to verify the spelling of those streets, investigators found. LAFD officials were also described as 'cautious in issuing evacuation notices' because those decisions 'are often subject to public and governmental scrutiny,' according to the report. California's public alert process, it concluded, is 'overly complex.'

By 11:29 a.m. — the moment an LAFD assistant chief radioed for 'evacuation all the way down to PCH' — spot fires had already taken hold on both sides of a main road out of the neighborhood, according to the report. The first formal order came 40 minutes later.

The problems had begun hours before the fire ignited. That morning, despite dangerous wind conditions, LAFD sent its outgoing shift home rather than keeping those firefighters on duty. Three additional engines, funded by the city and staffed with fire inspectors reassigned from other roles, were all the department added. The county fire department took a different approach: it kept its outgoing shift on, doubling its force from roughly 1,500 firefighters to nearly 3,000 and putting more than 20 extra backup engines into service.

Investigators wrote that the city's staffing and recall decisions 'did not follow their own written procedures and appeared to be largely budget constraint-driven.' When LAFD did attempt to call in off-duty firefighters after the fire broke out, the effort collapsed. A recall announcement that aired on TV and radio, according to the report, went out to 'anyone with firefighting experience' and included the department's internal staffing phone number. The resulting flood of calls from around the world overwhelmed those lines for more than 48 hours.

Investigators also determined that the LAFD leaders initially directing the Palisades fire response had insufficient experience with large, complicated fires, which led other agencies to work on their own rather than in coordination. On-the-ground personnel lost faith in their incident commanders and were at times left to make decisions without waiting for commanders' approval.

Police faced their own contradictions. Around 5:56 p.m. on January 7, the LAPD's on-scene commander told officers to stand down from rescues and evacuations in areas the fire department had designated as too dangerous to enter. Yet nearly every area requiring evacuation was in or near active fire. Investigators wrote that 'Officers disregarded the directive and continued to conduct evacuations and rescues where residents remained at risk.' No deaths were attributed to that directive by the report.

In the Eaton fire, which burned through Altadena, a separate cascade of failures unfolded. L.A. County Sheriff's Department officers were already going door-to-door and using patrol car PA systems to warn residents well over three hours before the first evacuation alert reached west Altadena — yet no widespread alert was issued. Around the same time, an L.A. County paramedic squad responding to the area reported 'embercast like snow and structures on fire,' according to the report. Because the paramedic squad was not formally assigned to the fire incident, 'no information on what they witnessed was reported to anyone working on the incident.' A formal evacuation order covering most of western Altadena was not issued until 3:25 a.m. on January 8, which was more than four hours after the first 911 call west of Lake Avenue. Eighteen of the 19 people killed in the Eaton fire lost their lives in that area.

The circumstances of several fatalities suggest that some individuals may not have been aware of the fire's proximity or their evacuation status.— UL Research Institutes' Fire Safety Research Institute

Investigators also examined the Lachman Fire, a small blaze on New Year's Day in Pacific Palisades that, according to a federal ATF affidavit, smoldered underground and re-emerged as the Palisades Fire six days later. After LAFD contained the Lachman fire on January 1, crews returned the following day to remove a hose. One captain voiced objections to pulling the hose, saying it might still be needed for mop-up work. That captain later saw a wisp of smoke. A firefighter paramedic raised concerns that control lines were not clearly established and pointed out a hot spot. Investigators uncovered no evidence that the Fire Department kept watch over the burn area as dangerous fire-weather conditions approached. The report also found that Topanga State Park, where part of the January 1 fire burned, had developed its wildfire plan without consulting fire agencies.

Throughout both fires, older adults and people with limited mobility bore a disproportionate share of the harm, the report found. In many cases, opportunities to evacuate were 'limited, delayed, or declined.' In one instance in nearby Malibu, a relative told authorities that no evacuation order had been given as the fire closed in on a home. She urged him to leave. He stayed.

The whole system was, in a sense, just boiling — primed and ready to release all of that stored-up energy come January 7th.— Derek Alkonis, senior research program manager, Fire Safety Research Institute

Mayor Karen Bass, who ousted then-Fire Chief Kristin Crowley weeks after the fire, said the report 'confirms much of what we already knew.' She said that under new Chief Jaime Moore, 92% of the recommendations from LAFD's own internal review have already been implemented, and that department heads across the city assured her 'every recommendation in this report will be addressed.'

We must use these lessons learned to strengthen preparedness and help every community be better equipped to respond to the growing, climate-driven wildfire threat.— Gov. Gavin Newsom

For survivors, the report's refusal to assign individual blame has landed poorly. The news did not come as a surprise to Jeremy Padawer, 52, a toymaker who lost his home in the Palisades.

This was a disaster of their making. What made me angry wasn't the fact that a fire burned my house down. That made me sad. Things weren't even done burning down yet before they decided they were gonna point the blame towards us and towards God.— Jeremy Padawer, Palisades fire survivor

UL Research Institutes Vice President Steve Kerber called for reinforcing the entire system to achieve meaningful wildfire resilience and pressed for a move toward community-scale risk reduction strategies as firestorms grow more common. The report's more than 250 recommendations span training, communication protocols, staffing procedures, and alert systems — and now represent the most detailed public accounting yet of what went wrong on one of the deadliest fire days in California history.

Why it matters — The report is the most detailed public accounting of what went wrong on one of California's deadliest fire days, and its 250-plus recommendations will shape how LA — and other cities facing worsening wildfire seasons — staff, train, and warn residents in future emergencies.

Reported by wol.com, latimes.com, ground.news