
Chinese room
Chinese room is a thought experiment arguing that a computer cannot exhibit "understanding". It came out in 1980. It was created by John Searle.
- Came out
- 1980
- Created by
- John Searle
All 4 facts, and where they come from
Facts
4 facts · 0 confirmed by two sources · 1 cited · 3 from one source
Where this comes from
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What Wikidata says · copied November 16, 2026 · revision 2563276785
- Described as
- thought experiment arguing that a computer cannot exhibit "understanding"
- Other names
- Chinese room argument
- What it is
- argument; thought experiment
- Created by
- John Searle · 1 reference
- Came out
- 1980
- Wikipedias with a page
- 44
Wikidata item Q304726 (wikidata.org/wiki/Q304726), public domain (CC0). Copied 2026-11-16.
What Wikipedia says · copied November 16, 2026 · revision 1383832156
The Chinese room argument holds that a computer executing a program cannot have a mind, understanding, or consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave. The argument was presented in a 1980 paper by the American philosopher John Searle, entitled "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and published in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Precursor arguments had been made by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Peter Winch, Anatoly Dneprov, et al.; Searle's version has been widely discussed in the years since.
The centerpiece of Searle's argument is the "Chinese room" thought experiment. Searle supposes a computer program which receives and outputs Chinese characters, carrying out instructions so perfectly that humans cannot distinguish it from a Chinese-speaking person. Searle then supposes he is in a room, receiving Chinese characters slipped under the door. He follows an English version of the computer program step-by-step, which instructs him to return output Chinese characters. Searle argues that as he would not understand the conversation, and there is no essential difference between his role and the computer's, that a computer is not capable of understanding.
The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols, and that simulation of a given mental state is sufficient for its presence. Specifically, the argument is intended to refute a position Searle calls the strong AI hypothesis: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."
Although its proponents originally presented the argument in reaction to statements of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, it is assumed by computer scientists to not be an argument against the goals of mainstream AI research because of their perspective that it does not show a limit in the amount of intelligent behavior a machine can display.
Widely discussed, the argument has been subject to significant debate among philosophers of mind and AI researchers, and is a touchstone of contemporary philosophy.
From the Wikipedia article “Chinese room” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room), by its contributors, under CC BY-SA 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Copied 2026-11-16; not changed.
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Picture: Wikimedia Commons: Chinese Room thought experiment with countryballs.jpg · See Commons file page
