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U.S. intelligence warns Congress: Saudi Arabia has not ruled out nuclear weapons

Classified documents sent to Congress include an assessment that Riyadh has not closed the door on a weapons program — even as a July deal gives Saudi Arabia a path to enrich uranium.

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File:(Map showing neutral zones between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). LOC 91682276.tif: United States. Central Intelligence Agency / Wikimedia Commons

The U.S. intelligence community has assessed that Saudi Arabia has not ruled out developing a nuclear weapons program — a finding delivered to Congress in classified documents tied to the Trump administration's July civilian nuclear agreement with Riyadh, according to U.S. officials who granted anonymity by The Washington Post.

The timing is politically charged: a 90-day congressional review of the agreement is now underway. The deal would open Saudi Arabia to tens of billions of dollars in nuclear energy contracts with American companies and, critically, could eventually allow the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own territory, up to a level of 20%.

Also included in the classified package was a separate State Department assessment, described as expressing greater confidence both in the agreement's safeguards and in commitments made by the Saudi government. The CIA declined to comment, according to The Washington Post.

The split between the intelligence community and the State Department captures the central tension in the deal: the Trump administration argues that U.S. company involvement in any Saudi enrichment program is sufficient protection against weapons development, while critics say the agreement's looser terms make that bet far too risky.

Under the agreement as described by people familiar with it, Saudi Arabia would initially import enriched uranium from abroad — as the United Arab Emirates does — rather than enrich domestically. During the first two years, the two countries would conduct a study on the economic feasibility of enrichment on Saudi soil and the safeguards required. If both sides determine domestic enrichment is necessary, a facility built by U.S. companies and their foreign suppliers would operate under an initial enrichment ceiling of 5%. A further study could then raise that ceiling to 20%, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post.

Experts note that 20% enrichment, while still below weapons-grade, completes much of the technical work required to reach the approximately 90% enrichment level needed for a nuclear weapon. Concerns have also been raised about whether enriched material might be covertly redirected for military use.

An additional structural issue is that the agreement stops short of requiring Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which would give the agency wider access to nuclear facilities and research sites. In a letter to Congress this week, twenty nuclear nonproliferation experts — among them former IAEA Director General Hans Blix — cautioned that the inspection framework could leave it unclear whether Saudi Arabia was covertly pursuing nuclear weapons at sites not publicly declared, according to The Jerusalem Post.

The UAE's 2009 civilian nuclear agreement with the United States, by contrast, required Riyadh's Gulf neighbor to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing and to accept the Additional Protocol — terms that have since been regarded as the 'gold standard' for such agreements. Saudi Arabia refused both conditions during negotiations.

It's bogus as hell.— Sen. Jeff Merkley, Democrat of Oregon

Merkley, who along with Sen. Ed Markey of Massachusetts led a group of Democratic senators in sending a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday, argued that Saudi Arabia's insistence on retaining the ability to enrich uranium domestically signals ambitions beyond civilian power generation.

If they've given up the intent to develop a nuclear weapon, then they'd give up domestic enrichment and reprocessing power, right? They'd accept massive inspections from the IAEA.— Sen. Jeff Merkley, Democrat of Oregon
The Trump administration is departing from precedent, adopting looser restrictions, and caving to Saudi demands.— Democratic senators led by Ed Markey and Jeff Merkley, in a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio

In a rebuttal to The Washington Post, the State Department said the United States 'does not and will not support a Saudi nuclear weapon program,' adding that the agreement was designed to advance nuclear energy cooperation while upholding what it called the most rigorous nonproliferation standards attainable through diplomacy.

Rather than address The Washington Post's questions directly, the Saudi government pointed the newspaper to a prior statement by Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman, in which he described the kingdom's nuclear program as peaceful and committed to the highest standards of responsibility and transparency.

The backdrop to the intelligence assessment is a statement Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made in 2018: that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear weapon if Iran developed one. Although the Trump administration carried out joint Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium is thought to have remained intact beneath the rubble of the targeted sites, according to The Washington Post — leaving in place the Iranian nuclear threat that MBS had cited.

The Trump administration has offered two main arguments in favor of the agreement: that U.S. company involvement in any enrichment program — using technology that would not be shared with the Saudis — provides a sufficient safeguard, and that without the deal, Riyadh could turn to China or Russia for nuclear assistance instead. Lawmakers seeking to block the agreement would need enough votes to overcome a presidential veto.

President Trump has also said the agreement will not take effect unless Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords and normalizes relations with Israel — a condition Riyadh has not accepted, as Saudi Arabia has declined to establish diplomatic relations with Israel while the Israeli government continues to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Why it matters — If Saudi Arabia uses a U.S.-backed civilian nuclear program as a stepping stone toward weapons capability, it could trigger a regional arms race in the Middle East and undermine decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

⚠ Not yet confirmed

  • Under the agreement, any Saudi enrichment would be controlled by U.S. companies using technology that would not be shared with the Saudis.
  • Iran's enriched uranium survived the 2025–2026 strikes and remains under rubble at damaged facilities.

Sources differ on Whether the agreement's safeguards are sufficient to prevent Saudi weapons development: The State Department says the deal maintains the strongest nonproliferation standards achievable diplomatically and that the U.S. will not support a Saudi nuclear weapon program. (jpost.com) vs The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Saudi Arabia has not ruled out developing nuclear weapons; Democratic senators and 20 nonproliferation experts say the safeguards are inadequate. (washingtonpost.com)

Reported by washingtonpost.com, ynetnews.com, jpost.com

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