U.S. officials say wave of tech outages is not a cyberattack — but questions linger
The DNI, DHS secretary, and FBI deputy director told Congress the FAA ground stop, NSA network disruption, and bank outages are unrelated maintenance failures — even as a separate China-linked hacking campaign was dismantled.
In the span of days, the FAA grounded flights nationwide, the NSA's internal network went dark, banks and Microsoft services faltered, and airlines struggled — and on Wednesday, the country's top national security officials sat before Congress and said: it's all a coincidence.
Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, and FBI Deputy Director Christopher Raia appeared before the House Homeland Security Committee to deliver a unified assessment: the string of technology outages affecting critical systems were separate incidents caused by routine maintenance, software patching, and hardware upgrades — not a coordinated attack by a foreign adversary.
These are separate service outages associated with maintenance and technical changes. They are not a coordinated or state-sponsored attack.— Jay Clayton, Director of National Intelligence
At this point, there is no indication whatsoever that there is any cyber malicious activity related to any of those incidents.— Christopher Raia, FBI Deputy Director
Mullin went further, telling lawmakers he is '98% confident' the outages are not the result of malicious foreign activity — while also acknowledging he had 'absolutely not' seen this many outages in this short a period of time, according to CBS News.
The FAA disruption alone was significant: officials said telecommunications contractor L3Harris Technologies had been replacing aging copper communications lines with fiber optic connections at a remote facility when a router being switched began flooding other routers and overloaded the system. The resulting nationwide ground stop was only the second of its kind since September 11, 2001, according to CBS News, and caused airport chaos that stretched through the weekend.
The NSA outage drew particular scrutiny from lawmakers. Rep. Dan Goldman, a New York Democrat, pressed Clayton repeatedly on whether the disruption stemmed from internal technical work or something else.
It's a pretty binary. It's either external or internal, right?— Rep. Dan Goldman, U.S. Representative (D-NY)
Clayton described routine maintenance procedures — software patches, system upgrades, hardware replacement — and said officials found no evidence of outside interference. Goldman was unconvinced by the framing.
You're a very smart person, and you're clearly not answering my direct questions.— Rep. Dan Goldman, U.S. Representative (D-NY)
We have no indication that they have come from external threat actors.— Jay Clayton, Director of National Intelligence
The White House reinforced the message the same day. According to whitehouse.gov, a joint statement attributed to Clayton and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio indicated that the Trump administration has found no evidence of a coordinated cyberattack, state-sponsored activity, or malign actor, characterizing the outages instead as the result of companies patching vulnerabilities and upgrading outdated systems.
Clayton also warned Congress that the pace of technological change itself is straining legacy government infrastructure. 'The speed of compute and the level of capability of applications that use that compute is increasing substantially,' he said, a remark that pointed to systems already considered outdated falling even further behind as computing capabilities continue to accelerate.
The hearing unfolded against a separate, unrelated development that underscored the genuine state of the cyber threat landscape: the same week, the FBI and Department of Justice announced they had seized domains linked to a years-long Chinese state-backed hacking campaign targeting U.S. critical infrastructure and federal agencies. Court records cited by Cybersecurity Dive show the operation — attributed to a group known as QTFY, employed by a company called Nanjing Xinjuwei Network Technology Company — had directed attacks at the DOJ, NASA, the Federal Reserve, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Senate, telecom firms, hospitals, defense contractors, power companies, and financial institutions. Among the group's paying customers were the People's Liberation Army and China's Ministry of State Security.
Researchers at Black Lotus Labs, part of Lumen Technologies, described the Chinese operation as using a 'quartermaster model' — integrating reconnaissance, proxy orchestration, and operational routing to hide the true origin of attacks. According to Cybersecurity Dive, QTFY deployed a tool called QScan to compromise thousands of internet-of-things devices around the world, then funneled its activity through a network called QTRouter that incorporated commercial proxy servers and virtual private servers the hackers had leased. The program's origins had gone undetected for years, with no direct link to China previously established.
From what we saw, this was a classic espionage campaign focused on reconnaissance, exploitation, and information collection. We did not observe any information influence operations or destructive components.— Damon Rouse, Senior Information Security Engineer, Black Lotus Labs
Officials and researchers were explicit: the QTFY takedown is not connected to the recent tech outages. But the two stories running in parallel illustrate the environment in which the outages occurred — one where Chinese state-backed hackers had been quietly embedded in U.S. critical infrastructure networks for years, and where the line between a maintenance failure and a concealed intrusion is exactly the kind of question Congress was pressing officials to answer more definitively.
The hearing also touched on a separate threat: lawmakers raised concerns about reports that Iranian-linked actors may be developing plans to target senior Trump administration officials using radiological or chemical weapons. Mullin confirmed that the possibility of Iranian sleeper cells operating inside the United States is 'a concern,' while Raia cautioned that intelligence reporting about possible plots does not mean attackers have the capability to carry them out.
A lot of the reporting is largely aspirational. But that does not mean we do not take it seriously.— Christopher Raia, FBI Deputy Director
According to CBS News, officials stopped short of publicly confirming that Iranian sleeper cells were preparing attacks or that any dirty bomb or chemical weapons plans were operational. Raia noted that authorities had overhauled their Iranian threat mission center in order to bolster defenses against potential attacks.
For now, the official position holds: the outages were accidents, not attacks. Tied to the QTFY takedown, the NSA advisory urged organizations to keep IoT and network device firmware current, separate critical systems from edge devices, and review internet-facing applications for signs of suspicious activity — steps that remain relevant whether or not any particular outage proves to have been deliberate.
Why it matters — The simultaneous failure of FAA, NSA, bank, and airline systems — even if accidental — exposed how quickly aging government and commercial infrastructure can cascade into national disruption, while a parallel Chinese espionage takedown confirmed that state-backed hackers have been embedded in those same systems for years.
⚠ Not yet confirmed
- The NSA outage was definitively caused by internal software and technological upgrades rather than any external actor.
- Iranian-linked actors are developing plans to target senior Trump administration officials with radiological or chemical weapons.
- Iranian sleeper cells are actively preparing attacks inside the United States.
Sources differ on Whether the NSA outage was caused by internal maintenance or an external actor: No indication of external threat actors; consistent with routine maintenance including software patches and hardware replacement. (cbsnews.com (Clayton testimony)) vs Rep. Goldman argued Clayton was not answering directly and pressed for a definitive internal/external determination, which Clayton did not provide. (cbsnews.com (Goldman questioning))
Reported by whitehouse.gov, cbsnews.com, cybersecuritydive.com
- Marco Rubio72nd United States Secretary of State since 2025
- Markwayne MullinAmerican politician (born 1977)
- Jay ClaytonAmerican lawyer
- Dan GoldmanAmerican politician and attorney (born 1976)