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Schlieffen Plan

Schlieffen Plan is a German General Staff's early-20th-century overall strategic plan. It came out in 1905. It was created by Alfred von Schlieffen.

Came out
1905
Created by
Alfred von Schlieffen
All 5 facts, and where they come from

Facts

5 facts · 0 confirmed by two sources · 0 cited · 5 from one source

What it is
military operation plan One source
Created by
Came out
1905 One source
Country
German Reich One source
Named after

Where this comes from

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What Wikidata says · copied November 17, 2026 · revision 2517428643
Described as
German General Staff's early-20th-century overall strategic plan
What it is
military operation plan
Created by
Alfred von Schlieffen
Came out
1905
Country
German Reich
Named after
Alfred von Schlieffen
Wikipedias with a page
49

Wikidata item Q152468 (wikidata.org/wiki/Q152468), public domain (CC0). Copied 2026-11-17.

What Wikipedia says · copied November 17, 2026 · revision 1368987994

The Schlieffen Plan (German: Schlieffen-Plan, pronounced [ʃliːfən plaːn]) is a name given after the First World War to German war plans, due to the influence of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen and his thinking on an invasion of France and Belgium, that began on 7 August 1914. Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff of the German Army from 1891 to 1906. In 1905 and 1906, Schlieffen devised an army deployment plan for a decisive (war-winning) offensive against France. German forces were to invade France through the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium rather than across the common border.
After losing the First World War, the German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers, described the plan as a blueprint for victory. Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Helmuth von Moltke the Younger had succeeded Schlieffen as Chief of the German General Staff in 1906 and was dismissed after the First Battle of the Marne (5–12 September 1914). German historians claimed that Moltke had ruined the plan by tampering with it, out of timidity. They managed to establish a narrative that Moltke failed to follow the blueprint devised by Schlieffen, condemning the belligerents to four years of attrition warfare.
In 1956, Gerhard Ritter published Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth), which began a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny. Treating the plan as a blueprint was rejected because this was contrary to the tradition of Prussian war planning established by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, in which military operations were considered to be inherently unpredictable. Mobilisation and deployment plans were essential but campaign plans were pointless; rather than attempting to dictate to subordinate commanders, the commander gave his intent and subordinates achieved it through Auftragstaktik (mission tactics).
In writings from the 1970s, Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, Hew Strachan and others studied the practical aspects of an invasion of France through Belgium and Luxembourg. They judged that the physical constraints of German, Belgian and French railways and the Belgian and northern French road networks made it impossible to move enough troops far enough and fast enough for them to fight a decisive battle if the French retreated from the frontier. Most of the pre-1914 planning of the German General Staff was secret and the documents were destroyed when deployment plans were superseded each April. The bombing of Potsdam in April 1945 destroyed much of the Prussian army archive and only incomplete records and other documents survived. Some records turned up after the fall of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), making an outline of German war planning possible for the first time, proving wrong much post-1918 writing.
In the 2000s, a document, RH61/v.96, was discovered in the trove inherited from the GDR, which had been used in a 1930s study of pre-war German General Staff planning. Inferences that Schlieffen's war planning was solely offensive were found to have been made by extrapolating his writings and speeches on tactics into grand strategy. From a 1999 article in War in History and in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (2002) to The Real German War Plan, 1906–1914 (2011), Terence Zuber engaged in a debate with Terence Holmes, Annika Mombauer, Robert Foley, Gerhard Gross, Holger Herwig and others. Zuber proposed that the Schlieffen Plan was a myth concocted in the 1920s by partial writers, intent on exculpating themselves and proving that German war planning did not cause the First World War. Later scholarship did not uphold the Zuber thesis except as a catalyst for research which revealed that Schlieffen had been far less dogmatic than had been presumed.

From the Wikipedia article “Schlieffen Plan” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlieffen_Plan), by its contributors, under CC BY-SA 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Copied 2026-11-17; not changed.

Confirmed Two sources agree. Cited One source, and it names where it got it. One source One source, without a reference of its own. Sources disagree The sources disagree. We show the best-supported value and keep theirs below.

Picture: Wikimedia Commons: Schlieffen Plan fr.svg · See Commons file page

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