Quine–Putnam indispensability argument
Quine–Putnam indispensability argument is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics. It was created by Willard Van Orman Quine and Hilary Putnam.
- Created by
- Willard Van Orman Quine
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Facts
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What Wikidata says · copied November 16, 2026 · revision 2570179351
- Described as
- argument in the philosophy of mathematics
- What it is
- mathematical concept; philosophical argument
- Created by
- Willard Van Orman Quine; Hilary Putnam
- Named after
- Willard Van Orman Quine; Hilary Putnam
- Wikipedias with a page
- 8
Wikidata item Q107863149 (wikidata.org/wiki/Q107863149), public domain (CC0). Copied 2026-11-16.
What Wikipedia says · copied November 16, 2026 · revision 1383336870
The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets, a position known as mathematical Platonism. It was named after the philosophers Willard Van Orman Quine and Hilary Putnam, and is one of the most important arguments in the philosophy of mathematics.
Although elements of the indispensability argument may have originated with thinkers such as Gottlob Frege and Kurt Gödel, Quine's development of the argument was unique for introducing to it a number of his philosophical positions such as naturalism, confirmational holism, and the criterion of ontological commitment. Putnam gave Quine's argument its first detailed formulation in his 1971 book Philosophy of Logic. He later came to disagree with various aspects of Quine's thinking, however, and formulated his own indispensability argument based on the no miracles argument in the philosophy of science. A standard form of the argument in contemporary philosophy is credited to Mark Colyvan; whilst being influenced by both Quine and Putnam, it differs in important ways from their formulations. It is presented in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Therefore, we ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
Nominalists, philosophers who reject the existence of abstract objects, have argued against both premises of this argument. An influential argument by Hartry Field claims that mathematical entities are dispensable to science. This argument has been supported by attempts to demonstrate that scientific and mathematical theories can be reformulated to remove all references to mathematical entities. Other philosophers, including Penelope Maddy, Elliott Sober, and Joseph Melia, have argued that we do not need to believe in all of the entities that are indispensable to science. The arguments of these writers inspired a new explanatory version of the argument, which Alan Baker and Mark Colyvan support, that argues mathematics is indispensable to specific scientific explanations as well as whole theories.
From the Wikipedia article “Quine–Putnam indispensability argument” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine–Putnam_indispensability_argument), by its contributors, under CC BY-SA 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Copied 2026-11-16; not changed.
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